Abstract-We present a study on the algebraic degree of iterated permutations seen as multivariate polynomials. The main result shows that this degree depends on the algebraic degree of the inverse of the permutation which is iterated. This result is also extended to noninjective balanced vectorial functions where the relevant quantity is the minimal degree of the inverse of a permutation expanding the function. This property has consequences in symmetric cryptography since several attacks or distinguishers exploit a low algebraic degree, like higher order differential attacks, cube attacks, and cube testers, or algebraic attacks. Here, we present some applications of this improved bound to a higher degree variant of the block cipher , to the block cipher Rijndael-256 and to the inner permutations of the hash functions ECHO and JH.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
OST of the symmetric cryptographic primitives that are used nowadays, including block ciphers and hash functions, base their designs on an inner function that is iterated a high number of times. This transformation, called the round function, is very often a permutation. The algebraic degree of this permutation, i.e., the degree of the corresponding multivariate polynomial, is a quantity that plays an important role on the security of the symmetric primitive. Actually, a cryptographic primitive of low algebraic degree is vulnerable to many attacks, for instance higher order differential attacks [1] - [3] , algebraic attacks [4] , [5] , or cube attacks [6] .
Here, we show that, even if the inverse of the round permutation is never used in practice, as it is the case for Feistel ciphers or for hash functions, its degree also plays a fundamental role on the degree of the composition and in consequence on the overall degree of the primitive. Even if the degree of the round function is high, if the degree of the inverse is low, the degree of the cipher will be much lower than expected. This result helps in general the understanding of the evolution of the algebraic degree of iterated permutations. Several earlier works have established new bounds on the degree of such permutations: most notably, [7] connects the degree of with the divisibility of the Walsh spectrum of by a high power of 2 and a recent result [8] applies to the families of functions composed of several smaller balanced functions. Here, we derive some new bounds on the degree of which involve the degree of . In the design of some particular ciphers, the nonlinear building blocks in the round function are not permutations. This is, for example, the case for the data encryption standard (DES) that uses a collection of eight 6 4 balanced functions. Obviously, the notion of inverse does not exist for such functions. However, we show that the overall degree of the cipher depends on the minimal degree of the inverse of any permutation expanding the output of the function. Thus, a result, similar to the one for permutations, can be derived.
As illustrations, we apply our results to , a variant of , a cipher proposed by Knudsen and Nyberg in [9] . In this variant, the quadratic round permutation which was originally used in is replaced by a function with higher degree but derived from a permutation whose inverse has algebraic degree 2. Our new bounds are also applied to the cipher Rijndael-256 and to two hash functions accepted for Round 2 in the SHA-3 competition, ECHO and JH.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After some preliminaries on the algebraic degree of a vectorial function, different attack techniques that exploit a low algebraic degree are recalled in Section II. Section III presents the main result on the influence of the inverse of a permutation on the degree of and includes some corollaries. A variant of the main result for noninjective balanced functions is presented in Section IV. Finally, an attack on a variant of the block cipher [9] is illustrated in Section V, together with applications to Rijndael-256 and to some hash functions.
II. EXPLOITING A LOW ALGEBRAIC DEGREE IN CRYPTANALYSIS
The whole paper focuses on functions from into . The coordinates of such a function are the Boolean functions , , such that for all . The algebraic degree of is defined by the algebraic degrees of its coordinates as follows. Moreover, the coefficients in the algebraic normal form of a Boolean function can be easily computed from pairs of inputs/outputs of as follows [10] :
where means that for all , and the sum is computed modulo 2. It is worth noticing that, when all the values of are known, the coefficients of the algebraic normal form can be computed all together by the Moebius transform with time complexity [11, p. 286] . From the other side, every vectorial function from into can also be seen as a univariate polynomial over . This representation is possible because can be identified with an -dimensional vector space over . Thus, for every such , there exists a unique univariate polynomial representation over , of degree at most
In this case, it can be shown that the algebraic degree of represented in such a way is given by where denotes the Hamming weight of the -bit vector corresponding to the binary expansion of (see, e.g., [12, Definition 4] ).
Many statistical attacks against symmetric cryptosystems exploit the fact that a family of functions (resp. of permutations), whose inputs and outputs can be computed from plaintext/ciphertext pairs, is not pseudorandom. Several properties may be used to distinguish from a randomly chosen function, including the fact that some given coefficients in its algebraic normal form are not distributed as it is expected for a family of randomly chosen functions. The simplest attack exploiting some property of the coefficients of the algebraic normal form is the higher order differential attack introduced by Knudsen [2] : this attack uses that, for all values of , all coordinates of have degree strictly less than , in general, and strictly less than , in the case of a permutation. The algebraic degree of is then of primary importance since the data complexity of this cryptanalysis is proportional to [13] , [14] . The higher order differential attack has been generalized to other types of symmetric primitives, especially to stream ciphers, under different names (including cube distinguishers) in [15] - [19] . Cube attacks [6] and algebraic attacks [4] , [5] also exploit low-degree relations between some components of the cryptosystem, but they mainly aim at reducing the time complexity for recovering the secret key from a low-degree distinguisher. Finally, even if both univariate and multivariate degrees are related, all these attacks must be distinguished from the attacks exploiting a low univariate degree, like the interpolation attack and its variants [20] - [22] .
In the case of iterated block ciphers, i.e., ciphers consisting of several iterations of the same round permutation parametrized by different round keys, the target function usually corresponds to the encryption function where the last round is omitted. Then, the fact that has a low degree can be used to recover the last-round subkey either by an exhaustive search [20] , or by setting up a low-degree algebraic system in these subkey bits which can be solved with time complexity depending on the algebraic degree of the round function [3] , [23] . Predicting the evolution of the degree of the cipher when the number of rounds varies is then one of the main issues in higher order differential attacks.
III. ON THE DEGREE OF WHEN IS A PERMUTATION
A. General Problem
We now focus on the following general problem: let be a function from into and be a function from into , for some . Then, we aim at exhibiting some particular classes of functions such that the trivial bound can be improved.
The following two families corresponding to some common situations in cryptographic applications have been previously identified in [7] and [8] .
Proposition 3.1: [7] Let be a function from into and be a function from into . Assume that all Walsh coefficients of , i.e., all are divisible by for some integer ; then
When is a permutation, we can deduce the following corollary which involves the degree of . . This particular situation is actually very common in cryptography for obvious implementation reasons.
B. Main Result
We now show that the upper bound given by Corollary 3.1 can be improved. This improvement relies on the following theorem which bounds the maximum degree for the product of any coordinates of , for all . The following notation will then be extensively used. [27] - [29] . For instance, any transposition is an involution with algebraic degree . We can also deduce from Corollary 3.3 that for any integer such that we have
It follows that implying that
We then recover in a different way the bound on which can be derived from Katz theorem [24] on the divisibility of the Walsh spectrum of a permutation. Actually, all Walsh coefficients of are divisible by and it is well known that the degree of a function whose Walsh coefficients are divisible by is at most (see, e.g., [7, Proposition 3] In some symmetric primitives, the functions used to provide confusion are not permutations, but balanced functions , with . An example of this design is the first encryption standard cipher, DES [30] , whose round function uses the parallel application of eight different 6 4 Sboxes, all of them of degree 5 in six variables.
An interesting problem is to be able to predict in some manner the evolution of the algebraic degree of the cipher after few rounds of encryption. Clearly, as the Sboxes of DES are not permutations, they cannot be inverted. Nevertheless, similar results as before can be deduced. Let us first prove that (i) implies (iii). We deduce from the previous reasoning that, if Condition (i) holds, any monomial of degree greater than or equal to in the ANF of the -variable Boolean function is not a factor of . Therefore, the restriction of such a monomial to any set with has degree strictly less than . It follows that, for any choice of , has degree strictly less than . Then, we have: (ii) (i) (iii). Conversely, we can prove that (iii) implies (ii). Suppose that (ii) does not hold, i.e., there exists some permutation expanding and some set such that the -variable Boolean function contains a monomial of the form for some set of size at least . We can suppose that is the smallest such set for inclusion (otherwise, we choose the smallest satisfying the property). Let us choose where is the monomial with the highest degree of this form in the ANF of . By hypothesis, the size of is at most , and it is greater than or equal to 1 since cannot have degree when [8, Prop 1] . Since is minimal for inclusion and it is clear that has degree if and only if the restriction of to the set has degree . However, the algebraic normal form of contains the monomial , implying that has degree at least . It follows that, for these particular choices of and , implying that there exists some product of or fewer coordinates of which has degree greater than or equal to . Finally, it follows that all three properties are equivalent.
A corollary similar to Corollary 3.2 can be deduced now for the case of noninjective balanced functions. We then deduce that all for if and only if for all . It is worth noticing that this property is similar to the property used in cube attacks [6, Th. 1].
Since this property holds for any coordinate of , the required condition equivalently means that, for any where the sum is an addition in . By definition of , all elements when correspond to the preimages of under . The condition can then be written as V. APPLICATIONS TO SOME SYMMETRIC PRIMITIVES In this section, we will show how the previous results can be used in order to predict the evolution of the algebraic degrees of some chosen permutations that are the main building blocks of some well-known block ciphers and hash functions.
A. Attacking the -Cipher and Its Variant
One of the first examples in the literature of a concrete attack exploiting the low algebraic degree of a symmetric primitive is the higher order differential attack presented by Jakobsen and Knudsen [20] against the -cipher. This construction, a.k.a CRADIC [31] , has been proposed by Nyberg and Knudsen in [9] . It is a six-round Feistel cipher over with a 198-bit secret key. Its round permutation is defined as follows (see Fig. 1): where is the th round subkey, is a linear expansion from into , is a linear truncation from into , and is the power function over . In this definition, the finite field is identified with the vector space . The main motivation behind this design is that the choice of , which is the only nonlinear part in the cipher, guarantees an optimal resistance to both linear and differential attacks. Thus, over , odd, was chosen, since it is an almost bent function [32] . More precisely, some lower bounds on the probabilities of the best differential and of the best linear approximation show that six rounds of this cipher are resistant to these attacks.
However, one of the main weaknesses of this cipher, identified by Jakobsen and Knudsen [20] , is that the encryption function has a low algebraic degree. Indeed, for any -round Feistel cipher, it can be observed that, when the right half of the input is a constant, the function which associates the left part of the output with the left part of the input has degree at most . Therefore, since the Sbox in the -cipher is quadratic, there exists a distinguisher for rounds with data and time complexity . This must be compared to the best known generic attacks against any four-round and five-round Feistel ciphers with 64-bit blocks, which have respective data complexities and [33] . Here, the whole encryption function can be distinguished from a random permutation with data complexity . Also, the 33-bit last round key can be recovered with average time complexity and data complexity pairs of chosen plaintexts-ciphertexts [23] . Therefore, it is now well known that, in an -round Feistel cipher, the Sbox must be chosen such that is much higher than half of the block size. But, there is no condition on the degree of the inverse of since is involved neither in the encryption function nor in the decryption function. The degree of may only affect the complexity of some algebraic attacks [4] . Therefore, a variant of this cipher, that we name , suggested by Nyberg and Knudsen in the same paper [9] does not present the same weakness. This variant is obtained by modifying and using instead the inverse of a quadratic permutation. Actually, it is known that any permutation and its inverse present the same resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis [34] . But, a major difference is that and may have different algebraic degrees. For instance, if is a quadratic power permutation over , odd, i.e., with , then the algebraic degree of is equal to [32] . Since the implementation complexity of the inverse of over is unacceptable in most applications, we consider the nonlinear function over composed of four parallel applications of the same function defined over like in where is an affine expansion from into with maximal rank, is a truncation from into , and is the inverse of a quadratic power permutation over , e.g., which is the inverse of . This function, which is the only nonlinear part of the cipher, has algebraic degree 5. It is worth noticing that it has a high univariate degree which prevents interpolation attacks. The round function of is depicted in Fig. 2 . It is defined by where corresponds to four parallel applications of , is the th 32-bit subkey, and and are two linear bijections over which aim at providing diffusion. While the trivial bound does not provide any relevant information on the degree of the left part of the output for five rounds or more, Theorem 3.1 shows that -cipher can also be broken by the attack proposed by Jakobsen and Knudsen. At this aim, we study the algebraic degree of the function which maps , the left half of the plaintext, to which is the left half of the output of the cipher after rounds. In the following, we denote by the function over defined by and we finally find that is a function of degree at most 29 of . This leads to a distinguisher on five rounds of with data complexity that improves the generic distinguisher. It is worth noticing that the same upper bound can be derived from Theorem 3.2 which additionally exploits the fact that corresponds to the concatenation of four permutations defined over .
Variant with nonbijective Sboxes:
The nonlinear function in can also be seen as the concatenation of four balanced Sboxes from into . Instead of applying Corollary 3.2 based on the degree of the inverse of the nonlinear function , we can then rely on the existence of a permutation expanding the 36 32 Sbox, with . Then, Corollary 4.2 applies and also shows that is a function of degree at most 29 of .
It is worth noticing that, if we consider another variant of the -cipher using the inverse of over as an Sbox, Corollary 3.2 leads to a distinguisher on four rounds exploiting that has degree at most 25. But, finding a relevant bound on the degree of remains an open problem.
B. On the Algebraic Degree of Rijndael-256
Rijndael-128 [35] is the algorithm selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2000 as the winner of the advanced encryption standard (AES) competition in order to replace the DES. Rijndael-, with has the form of a substitution-permutation-network. The key size varies between 128, 192, and 256 bits. Its round transformation applies to . For instance, the states for Rijndael-128 and Rijndael-256 are depicted in Fig. 3 .
Four basic layers are composing a round of the Rijndaeltransformation.
1) : The only nonlinear transformation of the cipher. Every byte is updated by an 8 8 Sbox of degree 7. The inverse transformation has the same degree.
2)
: Linear transformation that rotates to the left the bytes in each row by a certain offset. This offset depends on the block size . The offset is for example for Rijndael-128 and for Rijndael-256.
3)
: Linear transformation that applies in parallel to every column of the state.
4)
: The combination of the state with the round subkey using bitwise XOR. A round of the transformation applied to a state corresponds thus to
The number of rounds depends on the block size and on the key size. These values can be found in Table I .
As seen from the description, the only source of nonlinearity for Rijndael-is the transformation. This transformation has algebraic degree 7. By using the trivial bound as an estimation for the degree, we can see that the degree after two rounds is at most and after three rounds it is bounded by . Thus, it may be believed that only three rounds of encryption are enough for achieving the maximal degree.
We will show, using the results of Section III, that the above estimates of the required number of rounds are way too small. We will see in particular that for Rijndael-256, at least seven rounds are needed to achieve the maximal degree.
We start by giving a bound for the degree of two rounds of Rijndael-256. By using the superSbox view [36] , we can see these two rounds as the parallel application of eight copies of a function operating on 32-bit words, followed by a linear transformation.
corresponds to the so-called SDS transformation: it consists of two layers of four 8 8 balanced Sboxes As the state of Rijndael-256 is wide, after two rounds of the permutation, not all the parts of the state have been mixed together. Thus, we can apply a similar approach as before and see three rounds of the permutation as the parallel application of two copies of a function , operating now on 128-bit words, followed again by a linear layer. Theorem 2 of [8] gives now
Let
. is a permutation of degree at most 28 and its inverse has degree at most 28 too. Using that , we get a bound for the degree of Rijndael-256 after five rounds. From Theorem 3.2, we get that the constant associated with is at most 28 and we deduce finally that
We get a similar result for six rounds, by considering , which has degree at most 113. Since , the corresponding constant is at most 113, leading to Therefore, at least seven rounds are needed to achieve the maximal degree 255.
In order to make a comparison with previously known bounds and to see at what extension they are improved, we present in Table II upper bounds for Rijndael-256 coming from four different sources. The first column presents the results obtained by using the trivial bound, and the second column combines it with the superSbox view. Since the Walsh spectrum of the AES Sbox is divisible by 4 only, the bound from [7] provides the same results as the superSbox view. The last column illustrates the new results. A in the table means that the obtained bound corresponds to the maximal degree of a permutation, and thus provides no information.
C. Application to the ECHO Hash Function
The ECHO [37] hash function has been designed by Benadjila et al. for the NIST SHA-3 competition. It uses the HAIFA mode of operation. Its compression function has a 2048-bit input (corresponding to the chaining value and a message block whose respective lengths depend on the size of the message digest), and it outputs a 512-bit or a 1024-bit value. It relies on a 2048-bit AES-based permutation .
The permutation updates a 2048-bit state, which can be seen as a 4 4 AES state, composed of 128-bit words. In every round , three operations modify the state. These are the , , and transformations. These transformations can be seen as generalizations of the three classical AES transformations. In particular, 1) is a nonlinear transformation applied independently to every 128-bit cell. It consists of two AES rounds.
2) The and transformations are exact analogues of the AES and transformations, respectively, with the only difference that they do not operate on bytes but on 128-bit words. The number of rounds is specified to be 8 for the 256-bit candidate. Finally, each bit in the output of the compression function is defined as a linear combination of some output bits of and some input bits.
We will see how the algebraic degree of the permutation varies with the number of rounds. We will show that the degree does not increase as predicted and reaches its maximum value much later than expected. The algebraic degree of the permutation was believed to be high, as in every round the input has to pass twice through the Sbox layer, of degree 7. As , two rounds seemed to be enough to achieve the highest possible degree.
is the only source of nonlinearity in the round permutation. It is a 128-bit transformation corresponding to two rounds of AES. Its degree thus matches the degree of the transformation of Rijndael-256 and is hence at most 28. The two-round permutation is a permutation of the set of 2048-bit states, but it can be decomposed as four parallel applications of a permutation operating on 512-bit words, followed by a linear layer. We will determine the degree of any of these four applications. After the first round of the permutation , every bit of the state consists of polynomials of degree at most 28. By applying to this state, the first layer of Sboxes in every , the degree gets at most . We can apply now the bound of [8, Th. 2] to get the following bound on the degree of :
Let
. is then a permutation of degree at most 466. From Theorem 3.2, the constant associated with this permutation is at most 466, as the degrees of and of its inverse are both upper bounded by 466, therefore As for Rijndael, these results compared with the previously known bounds are summarized in Table III .
The same bounds hold for the inverse round transformation. Due to this observation, we are able to distinguish the inner per- mutation in ECHO from a random one. This can be done for instance by constructing many zero-sum partitions of size , i.e., partitions of the input set into eight sets of size such that all elements in each sum to zero and the corresponding images sum to zero too [38] , [39] . Such a partition can be constructed by the method introduced in [39] and detailed in [38, Proposition 2] . Let be any subspace of with codimension 3 and be its complement. Then, the eight sets form a zero-sum partition of for of size .
D. Application to the JH Hash Function
JH [40] is a hash function family, having some members submitted to the NIST hash function competition. It has been chosen in late 2010 to be one of the five finalists of the contest.
The compression function in JH is constructed from a block cipher with constant key. This compression function is based on an inner permutation, named and is composed of 42 steps of a round function , where for the SHA-3 candidate. applies to a state of bits, divided into 4-bit words. It consists of three different layers: an Sbox layer, a linear layer, and a permutation layer .
1) The Sbox layer corresponds to the parallel application of Sboxes to the state. Two different Sboxes, and , are used in JH. Both of them, as also their inverses, are of degree 3. The selection of the Sbox to use is made by the bits of the round constant, which are not xored to the state as done in other constructions.
2) The linear layer mixes the words two by two.
3) The permutation permutes the words of the state. Two rounds of , for , can be seen in Fig. 4 . A round of the permutation is of algebraic degree 3, as the only source of nonlinearity of the cipher comes from the 4-bit Sboxes. Thus, if we try to estimate the evolution of the degree by using the trivial bound, we can see that the degree of the permutation after six rounds is at most and consequently the maximal degree seems to be reached just seven rounds of encryption only. We will show by applying the results of Section III that the algebraic degree of JH does not increase as expected.
An important observation on the structure of the permutation is that for , rounds of , denoted by , can be seen as the concatenation of permutations over . The bounds on the degree up to eight rounds of the permutation, given by the above formula can be seen in Table IV . The same bounds hold for the inverse permutation.
Using now Theorem 3.2, we get that the constant of the permutation over is at most 409. Thus, we have that
The same technique applied to 9 to 16 rounds leads to the results presented in Table V , with a comparison with the previous best results.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our study points out that, in many situations, the algebraic degree of an iterated function does not grow as fast as expected with the number of rounds. In particular, the degree of the inverse of the iterated permutation or, in the case of a noninjective function, the minimal degree of the inverse of a permutation expanding the function, has some influence on the degree TABLE V  UPPER BOUNDS FOR ITERATIONS OF THE ROUND PERMUTATION OF JH,  OBTAINED BY USING THE TRIVIAL BOUND, THE SUPERSBOX VIEW (OR THE BOUND FROM [7] ) AND THE NEW RESULTS, RESPECTIVELY of the iterated function. This observation can be used for exhibiting nonideal behaviors in some cryptographic primitives, like block ciphers or hash functions. However, turning such distinguishers into real attacks, like a key-recovery attack on a cipher or a (second)-preimage attack on a hash function, is a difficult problem. The most promising approach consists in combining some properties of the algebraic normal form of an inner function (e.g., its low degree) and the solving of some algebraic system, as proposed in [3] and [41] . Another open problem is to determine the impact of our result on some stream ciphers which appear to be vulnerable to several attacks exploiting the existence of some function with a low degree [6] , [42] .
